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Producer's Preference  for  a Cotton
Farmer Owned  Reserve:  An  Application
of Simulation  and Stochastic  Dominance
James W.  Richardson and Clair J.  Nixon
The benefits  to  a  typical  High  Plains  cotton  farmer  from  a  cotton  farmer  owned
reserve were estimated using a firm-level,  income tax and farm policy simulation model.
Eighteen  farm programs  were  simulated including  twelve  variations of a farmer owned
reserve  using different  entry prices  and trigger  prices.  The after-tax net present value
distributions for the different farm programs were compared  using stochastic dominance.
The  results  indicate  that  risk  averse  cotton  producers  should  prefer  the  1977  farm
program  to  either  a  cotton  farmer  owned  reserve  or  the  farm  program  proposed  by
Secretary  of Agriculture  Block.
The  Food  and  Agriculture  Act  of  1977  is
scheduled  to  expire  at  the  end  of the  1981
crop  year.  This  farm  program  has  provided
both  price  and  income  support  for  cotton
producers in the form of loan rates and target
prices. It has also provided disaster programs
which  aided  cotton  producers  whose  crop
yields  were  adversely  affected  by  the
weather.
The  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture  re-
commended  to Congress  that the  1981 Farm
Program  eliminate  target  prices,  deficiency
payments,  and  disaster programs  beginning
with the  1982 crop year.  The explanation  for
eliminating  the  target  price  and  deficiency
payment program is that it "was  designed to
protect  producers  before  advent  of  the  re-
serve  program,  and it has  since  lost most of
its  usefulness"  [Block,  p.11].  Despite  the
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Secretary's efforts, target prices and deficien-
cy  payments  for  the  major  crops  were  re-
tained  in the 1981  Act.
In  the  case  of  wheat  and  feed  grains,
eliminating target prices  and deficiency pay-
ments  may not  create  a significant  problem
for producers  since the Secretary proposed to
increase  the  attractiveness  of  the  farmer
owned  reserve  for  wheat  and  feed  grains.
Cotton  producers,  on  the  other  hand,  may
suffer  since  they  have  no farmer  owned  re-
serve  (FOR).  Since the  Secretary  advocated
the  elimination  of the  target  price  program
and  a  renewed  emphasis  on  the  FOR,  the
stage may be  set for the  creation  of a cotton
FOR.  The purpose  of this paper  is  to deter-
mine whether cotton producers  on the Texas
High Plains would likely prefer a cotton FOR
to current and past farm programs.
The  control  variables  for  the  wheat  and
feed grains  FOR are (a) entry level price,  (b)
trigger  price,  (c)  length  of the  reserve,  (d)
storage payment rate,  (e) interest rate,  and (f)
waiver  of interest  charges.  The  entry  level
price  is  the  loan  rate  if  stocks  enter  the
reserve  indirectly  (from  the  Commodity
Credit  Corporation  [CCC]  loan).  The  entry
price for a direct entry FOR can be set, at the
Secretary's  discretion,  above the loan rate to
encourage  greater  participation  in  the  re-
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serve.  The trigger price  is the price at which
stocks  may  be withdrawn  from  the  reserve,
which is between  140%  and  160% of the loan
rate.  The  Secretary  of  Agriculture  deter-
mines  the  length  of  the  reserve  (usually  3
years),  the  interest  rate  for  CCC  loans
(14.5%),  and the number of years  that inter-
est  is  to be  waived  (2 years  for  grains).  The
government's  annual  storage  payment  rate
for  grains  in  the  reserve  (26.5¢/bushel)  is
approximately  equal  to  the  cost  of commer-
cial  storage for one  year.
A  cotton  FOR  would  likely  have  most  of
the characteristics  of a reserve  for wheat and
feed  grains.  The  FOR  would  likely  be  a
direct  entry reserve  with  cotton  entering  at
the  national  loan  rate  ($0.525/lb.)  or  a  per-
centage  of  the  loan  rate.  The  trigger  price
would  likely be  set at  150%  of the  loan rate
and  the  length  of  the  reserve  would  be  3
years.  The interest rate charged for stocks in
the  reserve  would  be  about  14.5%  for  the
first  year  and zero  thereafter.  The commer-
cial  storage  cost  for  cotton  is  about
$12/bale/year  so the annual  storage payment
rate would  likely  equal this value.
Methodology
To  determine  whether  or  not  producers
would  prefer  a  cotton  FOR,  a typical  Texas
High Plains cotton farm  was simulated for 18
different farm  programs.  The  simulation  re-
sults  are  compared  using  stochastic  domi-
nance  to  determine  preference  by  various
risk  groups.  Kramer and  Pope  demonstrate
that  program  participation  or  preference  by
farmers  is  influenced  by  the  distribution  of
net returns rather  than  simply  the expected
net  returns.  Their  work  shows  stochastic
dominance  to be  superior  to mean-variance
in analyzing program preference,  particularly
when  the  distribution  of  net  returns  is
skewed  due  to  farm  programs.  (A  detailed
description  of  stochastic  dominance  is  pre-
sented by Kramer and Pope and by King and
Robison  [1981a,  1981b]).
In  the  case  of a  multiple-year  farm  pro-
gram,  such as a cotton  FOR,  stochastic domi-
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nance  requires  the generation  of the  proba-
bility distribution for net returns over,  say, a
10-year planning  horizon.  Net present  value
is  used since  it incorporates  both the  annual
cash  net  returns  and  changes  in  net worth,
over  the  planning  horizon.  Probability  dis-
tributions of the net present value associated
with  different  farm  programs  can  be  gener-
ated  using  a  Monte  Carlo  farm  simulation
model.
Description  of the  Model
The  model  selected  for  this  study  is  the
Farm  Level  Income  and  Policy  Simulation
Model  (FLIPSIM).  FLIPSIM  is  designed to
simulate  the  effects  of alternative  farm  pro-
grams  and income  tax  laws  on  the  survival,
growth,  and  success  of  typical  farms
(Richardson and  Nixon).  FLIPSIM  is a recur-
sive, farm-level,  stochastic simulation  model
which  simulates  the annual production,  farm
policy,  marketing,  financial  management,
growth, and income tax aspects of a farm over
a multiple-year  planning horizon.
The  model  is  stochastic  in  that  for  each
iteration  a different  set of annual crop prices
and yields  are  selected at  random from user
supplied probability  distributions.  The  mod-
el is  also recursive  in that the financial posi-
tion at the  end of one year,  is the beginning
financial  position  for  the  following  year.  (A
complete  run  consisted  of 50  iterations  of a
10-year planning  horizon).
The organization  of FLIPSIM is presented
in  Figure  1,  in  terms  of  the  major  sub-
routines  in  the  model.  At  the  start  of  each
year,  the  crop  mix  is  established,  based  on
the  user's  predetermined  mix  of  crops  and
the acreage  set-aside  requirements,  if appli-
cable  (CROPMX).  Stochastic  prices  and
yields are drawn at random  from multivariate
triangular  probability  distributions  provided
by the user (STOCH).  Total variable produc-
tion  costs  and  cash  receipts  are  calculated
based on  crop acreages  and stochastic prices
and  yields  (VCOSTS  and  RECPTS).  The
farm  policy  options  for  the  specific  run  are
simulated  and  the  necessary  income  adjust-
ments are  made (POLICY).
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Figure  1. Schematic of the Farm  Level Income  and Policy Simulator (FLIPSIM).
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The model calculates the standard financial
activities  of a farm,  such  as paying  fixed and
variable  costs,  making loan  payments,  with-
drawing family living expenses,  depreciating
machinery,  and  paying  income  taxes.2 The
market value  of farmland  is calculated  annu-
ally as  a function of a moving average  for the
rate  of  return  to  production  assets
(LANDVL). This allows the value of cropland
to adjust over time to the changing profitabil-
ity of typical  farms  in the region.  When  the
farm  has  an  ending-year  cash  flow  deficit
(i.e.,  there  is  not  sufficient  income  to fully
repay the operating  loan)  a second mortgage
on  farmland  and/or  intermediate  assets  is
obtained.  If  a  second  mortgage  cannot  be
obtained  due to  excessive  debts,  the farm  is
permitted to  sell a portion of the farmland to
cover  ending-year  cash  flow  deficits  (RE-
FIN). The maximum debt asset ratio the farm
is  permitted  to  carry  is  20%  on  long-term
assets  and  30%  on  intermediate  assets.  If
adequate  cash  is  available  at  year  end,  the
farm  may grow by leasing or purchasing  160
acres  of  cropland  in  odd  years,  i.e.,  1981,
1983,  .... ,  1989  (GROW).  To  grow,  the
1Annual  family living expenses  are  calculated  using the
following consumption  function:





where  FFS  is  family  size,  ADI  is  disposable  income,
and  CPI  is  the  Consumer  Price  Index  for  all  com-
modities and services (1967= 100).  The CPI is included
to  make  consumption  homogeneous  of degree  one  in
income  and  prices.  The  function  for  farmers  on  the
Southern  Plains  was  estimated  using  the  SRS  "Farm
Operator Family Living Expenditure Survey for 1973."
The  average  and  marginal  propensities  to  consume,
calculated at the mean,  are 0.89 and 0.56,  respectively.
2The model computes the farm operator's annual income
tax  using the  lesser of the  regular  tax  computation  or
income  averaging.  A  farm  operator  is  assumed  to  be
married,  filing a joint income tax return,  and itemizing
personal deductions.  Schedule  Y of the  1980 tax code  is
used  to calculate  income  taxes.  All  sources  of income,
both  farm and  non-farm,  are  accounted  for,  including
capital  gain  income  and depreciation  recapture  (when
applicable).
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farm  must  have  sufficient  cash  reserves  to
pay  a 40%  downpayment  for cropland  and a
25%  downpayment  for any additional  equip-
ment required.
When  machinery  is fully  depreciated,  it is
either  sold  and  replaced,  kept,or  kept  and
replaced,  depending  upon  its  expected  use-
ful  life.  The market value of used  machinery
is  updated  annually  using  the  beginning
value for  each  machine  and an inflation  rate
for  used  equipment  provided  by  the  user.
Additional  farm  machinery  is  purchased  in
discrete  units  when  the  farm  grows  to  the
point where its present complement is inade-
quate.  Budgets  for the individual crop enter-
prises  are  adjusted  as  the  farm  grows,  thus
accounting  for  any  economies  or  dis-
economies  of size.
Typical Farm
The typical farm selected for this study is  a
1,100 acre cotton-sorghum  farm on the Texas
Southern High  Plains.  Data to describe  the
typical  farm  were  obtained  from  a  stratified
random  sample  of producers  on  the  High
Plains.  The  farm  consists  of  385  cropland
acres  owned  and 715 acres  leased on a crop-
share  basis.  Approximately  one-third  of the
farm is irrigated.  Crops that can be produced
on  the  farm  are  irrigated  cotton,  dryland
cotton,  irrigated  sorghum,  and  dryland  sor-
ghum.
Enterprise  budgets  for  these  crops
[McGrann,  et al.] provide the projected pro-
duction  costs  and  labor  requirements  for
1981,  which  is  the  first  year  simulated.  To
calculate  production  costs  over  the  remain-
der of the 10-year planning horizon,  the 1981
per acre  costs  of production are inflated  10%
annually.
Prices  of cotton lint,  cotton seed,  and sor-
ghum  were  inflated  at  7  percent  per  year
from  their  assumed  1981  modal  values  of
$.65/lb.,  $100/ton,  and  $5.00/cwt.,  respec-
tively.  Crop yields were assumed  to increase
1 percent per  year.  The  modal  crop  yields/
acre for irrigated  cotton,  dryland cotton,  irri-
gated sorghum,  and dryland sorghum in 1981
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were  450 lbs.,  225 lbs.,  32.5 cwts.,  and 4.07
cwts.,  respectively.  Annual  crop  prices  and
yields were drawn at random each year of the
planning horizon from multivariate triangular
probability  distributions.3 The  typical  crop
mix observed  for  the  area  during the  1977-
1980  period  was  held  constant  over  the  10-
year  planning horizon.
Items  in  the  machinery  complement  for
the typical farm  (2 sets  of 8-row equipment)
were  identified  from  the  farm  survey.  Each
item was assigned  an age  equal to the modal
age  observed  for  that  particular  type  of
machine or implement.  The machinery  com-
plement for the 1,100 acre farm is considered
to  be  adequate  to  farm  up  to  1,750  acres
[Beach].  When  a  farm  grows  past  this
threshold,  the operator  must buy a full  com-
plement  of  8-row  equipment  at  prevailing
market prices.  It was assumed that the  mar-
ket  value  of new  farm  machinery  would  in-
crease  10% per year while the nominal  mar-
ket value  of used  machinery would  increase
1%  per year.
Per acre  costs of production for cotton and
sorghum  are reduced appropriately  once the
farm  grows  past the  1,750  acre  level.  These
adjustments  are  based  on cost estimates  ob-
tained  from  the  farm  survey.  Crop  yields
were  also  adjusted  downward  slightly  once
the farm  grew  beyond,  1,750 acres.
The  farm's  beginning  debt  asset  ratio  is
40%,  the  average  observed  from  the  farm
survey.  Interest  rates  for  existing  long-  and
intermediate-term  debts  are  reported  to  be
about  7.5%  and  10%,  respectively.  It  is  as-
sumed  that  interest  rates  for  new  land  and
3The  1981  distributions  for prices  are  distributed  trian-
gularly  as  follows:  cotton,  $/lb.  -(0.40,  0.65,  0.80),
sorghum,  $/cwt.  ~(4.17,  5.00,  5.80),  and  cotton  seed,
$/ton  ~(90,  100,  125).  The 1981  distributions  for yields
are distributed triangularly  as follows: irrigated  cotton,
lbs./acre  -(420,  450,  800),  dryland  cotton,  lb./acre
-(0,225,  360),  irrigated  sorghum,  cwt./acre  -(28.7,
34.5,  39.6), and dryland  sorghum,  cwt./acre  -(0,  14.1,
19.2).  The minimum and maximum values  are updated
for years  1982-1990 as the modal values are inflated thus
maintaining  the  same  range  of values  as  shown for the
1981  distributions.
machinery  loans are 8%  and 12%, respective-
ly,  and  that  the  interest  rate  on  operating
capital  is  13%.  Interest rates  charged on sec-
ond  mortgages are  assumed  to be one-half of
a  percentage  point  higher  than  for  compar-
able new loans. In addition a  1% loan origina-
tion  fee  is  charged  for  refinancing  ending-
year cash  flow deficits.
A  minimum family  living expense  is set at
$14,800 in  1981 and inflated annually at 10%.
The  inflated  minimum  is  used  if it  exceeds
the  value  calculated  by  the  consumption
function.  Family  size  is  assumed  to  be  3
members  and  off-farm  income  from  all
sources  is assumed  to be $2,800 per year.
Farm Programs Analyzed
The  typical  farm  was  simulated  once  for
each farm program listed in Table 1. Scenario
A assumes  the typical  farm  does  not partici-
pate  in  any  farm  program.  Two  versions  of
the 1977  Farm Program were  simulated,  one
with the low yield disaster provision  (B1) and
one without (B2).  Three versions of Secretary
Block's proposed farm program were simulat-
ed (C1,  C2, and C3) using different loan rates
for Texas  High  Plains  cotton  $.43,  $.50  and
$.525/lb.,  respectively.
Twelve  cotton  FOR  programs were  simu-
lated  using  three  entry  prices,  two  release
prices,  and two  assumptions regarding  inter-
est waiver (programs D-0  in Table  1).  Entry
prices  for  the cotton  FOR,  $.50,  $.525,  and
$.578/lb.,  equal 115% of the 1981 Texas High
Plains cotton loan rate,  the 1981 national  loan
rate for cotton,  and 110% of the 1981 national
loan  rate,  respectively.  The  absolute  differ-
ence  between  the  1981  modal price and  the
entry  price  was  held  constant  as  the  modal
price  increased.  Two  trigger  prices,  135%
and  150%  of the national loan rate,  are  used
to determine the effect of the trigger price on
farmer  participation  in  a  FOR.  The  interest
rate charged  for FOR  loans is  10%  per year.
It  is  assumed  that  interest  will  be  either
waived  in the last 2 years  or waived  for all 3
years  of the reserve.
The  model  further  assumes  that  the farm
operator  will  place  the  entire  crop  in  the
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TABLE 1.  Farm  Programs  Selected  for Analysis
Non-participation  in any farm  program  provisions.
Food and  Agriculture Act of 1977-  price support, target price, disaster provision, entry and trigger price for
the sorghum  FOR,  and  payment  limitations  announced  for  1981  are  increased  annually to  maintain  the
relationship  to  their respective  1981  modal  crop prices and yields
Food and  Agriculture  Act of 1977 - program  B1  but without the disaster provisions.
Block's Proposal - program  B2 with  no target  prices after the  1981  crop year. The  1981  loan rate for High
Plains cotton is about $0.43/lb.
Block's  Proposal - program  C1  assuming  the 1981  loan  rate for High  Plains cotton  is $0.50/lb.
Block's  Proposal - program  C1  assuming the 1981  loan  rate for High  Plains cotton  is $0.525/lb.
Cotton  FOR - $0.50/lb. entry price,  $0.78/lb. trigger  price,  and  waiver of  the last two  years interest.
Cotton  FOR - $0.525/lb.  entry price,  $0.78/lb. trigger price,  and  waiver of the last two years  interest.
Cotton  FOR - $0.58/lb. entry  price,  $0.78/lb. trigger  price,  and  waiver of the last two years interest.
Cotton  FOR - $0.50/lb. entry  price,  $0.78/lb. trigger  price,  and  waiver of all  interest.
Cotton  FOR - $0.525/lb.  entry price,  $0.78/lb. trigger price,  and waiver of  all interest.
Cotton  FOR - $0.58/lb. entry price, $0.78/lb. trigger  price,  and  waiver of all  interest.
Cotton  FOR - $0.50/lb. entry  price,  $0.70/lb. trigger  price,  and  waiver of last two years  interest.
Cotton  FOR - $0.525/lb.  entry price,  $0.70/lb. trigger  price,  and waiver of  last two  years interest.
Cotton  FOR - $0.58/lb.  entry price,  $0.70/lb.  trigger price,  and  waiver of last two years  interest.
Cotton  FOR - $0.50/lb.  entry price,  $0.70/lb. trigger price,  and  waiver of all  interest.
Cotton  FOR - $0.525/lb.  entry  price,  $0.70/lb. trigger  price,  and waiver of all  interest.
Cotton  FOR - $0.58/lb.  entry price,  $0.70/lb. trigger  price,  and waiver of  all interest.
aLoan rates, target  prices, trigger  prices and  proven  yields for 1982-1990 are obtained  by increasing  their  1981
announced  values to  maintain  the relationships to their respective  1981  modal crop prices and  yields.
FOR  (or  CCC  loan)  if it  is  more  profitable
than  selling  the  crop  on  the  spot  market.
Stocks  enter  the  reserve  if  the  local  cash
price  is less than the effective entry price for
the reserve.  The effective  entry price  equals
the  announced  entry price  minus  one year's
interest and any  additional  costs  not covered
by  the  government  storage  payment.  (It  is
assumed  that government  storage  payments
cover  the  full  cost  of commercial  storage.)
Stocks  are  placed in  a CCC  loan  if the  spot
price  is  less  than  the  loan  rate  minus  the
commercial  storage  costs  for  9  months.
Stocks  in the  FOR  are  released  if the  spot
price  over the next  3 years  exceeds  the trig-
ger  price.  Stocks  in  the  CCC  loan  are  re-
leased  if the  following  year's  spot  price  ex-
ceeds  the loan price  plus interest charges for
9  months.  The spot price used in this  case  is
the stochastic  price for  cotton,  drawn  from a
probability  distribution  of  annual  average
prices.  As  a result,  the  model compared the
trigger price  to a spot price only once a year.
Results
The  farm programs  in  Table  1 were  simu-
lated for the  typical  High  Plains  cotton  farm
over the 1981-1990 time period. The after-tax
net present value distribution and the proba-
bility  of  survival  for  each  farm  program  is
summarized  in  Table  2.  As  expected,  the
Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 (B1) has the
highest mean  ($203,525) and the lowest stan-
dard  deviation  ($255,830)  for  net  present
value.  This  program  also  offers  the  highest
probability of the farm remaining  solvent for
10 years (86%).  In contrast,  non-participation
in  a farm  program (scenario  A) results  in the
lowest  probability  of survival  (58%)  and the
lowest mean net present value ($65,915).  The
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TABLE  2.  Summary  of  the  Net  Present  Value  Probability  Distributions  and  the  Farm's
Probability of Survival for Selected  Programs.
Net Present Value Distributionb  Farm's
Probability
Standard  of
Programa  Mean  Deviation  Skewness  Survivalc
($)  ($)  (%)
A  65,915  275,918  0.743  58
B1  203,525  255,830  0.545  86
B2  155,986  267,121  0.522  80
C1  75,792  271,377  0.721  64
C2  88,809  280,755  0.729  64
C3  104,993  279,094  0.583  64
D  73,200  275,864  0.807  62
E  75,107  278,581  0.812  62
F  90,813  281,940  0.819  64
G  80,533  276,958  0.742  62
H  85,002  280,798  0.742  64
1  125,679  294,548  0.661  70
J  76,202  283,482  0.905  62
K  84,188  297,370  0.980  62
L  97,720  267,003  0.840  72
M  95,894  285,748  0.656  62
N  103,739  298,971  0.844  64
0  193,644  338,732  0.681  70
aprovisions  for the individual programs  are described in Table 1.
bStatistics  for the distribution were calculated  using both observed  and  "unobserved"  values for the distribution.
Since the  model  stops simulating a farm  once it is declared  insolvent, the net  present value for  an  insolvent
iteration  is unobserved.  All  unobserved values for the distribution  were assumed  to  be  equal  - 186,000,  the
most negative net present value observed for any of the 18 scenarios simulated.  This practice normalizes  all 18
distributions  to  a common  base  point  and  permits  their  comparison  using  Meyer's  stochastic  dominance
program.
CSurvival  is defined as  remaining  solvent through  1990.
the  net  present  value  distributions  are
skewed differently  so mean-variance  analysis
should not be used  to predict program pref-
erence.  In general,  skewness increases as the
probability  of survival  decreases.  This  is,  in
part, due to a greater number of negative net
present value figures being  observed for the
less  profitable  scenarios.
Meyer's  stochastic  dominance  program
was  used  to  make  pair-wise  comparisons  of
the  net  present  value  probability  distribu-
tions.  The  program  requires  specification  of
lower,  rl(x),  and  upper,  r2(x),  boundary  risk
aversion  coefficients.  A  risk  aversion  coeffi-
cient indicates the amount that a given prob-
ability  must  be  altered  for  an  individual  to
accept an  actuarily  fair bet.  Three risk aver-
sion  intervals,  (-.00001,0),  (0,  .00001),  and
(-.00001,  .00001),  were  used  rather  than
eliciting  risk  aversion  coefficients  from  indi-
vidual  cotton producers.  These levels  repre-
sent risk aversion coefficients  for three differ-
ent groups of cotton producers,  ranging from
risk lovers  to  risk avoiders  and are  based  on
values  suggested  by previous  research (King
and Robison,  1981b).
The  results  of  the  stochastic  dominance
analysis  are  summarized  in  Table  3.  The
efficient  set  for  a  risk averse  producer  con-
tains  only  farm  program  B1,  the  Food  and
Agriculture  Act of 1977.  If a risk averse pro-
ducer is not allowed to participate in program
B1,  the producer's  next most preferred  effi-
cient  set  contains  farm  programs  B2  and  0,
the  1977  Act without  the disaster provisions
and the cotton  FOR with a high  entry price
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TABLE 3.  Predicted Preference  of High Plains Cotton Producers for Selected  Farm  Programs.
Utility Group1
Efficient  Risk  Risk  Risk
Sets  Preferred  Neutral  Averse
(programs)
2
Most preferred  set  B1,0  B1,0  B1
Second most
preferred set  B2,I,N  B2,F,I,L,N  B2,0
Third  most
preferred set  F,K,L  C3,H,K,M  I,L
Fourth  most
preferred set  C3,J,M  C2,E,G,J  C3
Fifth  most
preferred set  C2,H  C1,D  N
Sixth most
preferred set  G,E  A  C2,F,M
Seventh most
preferred set  C1,D  C1,G,H,K
Eighth  most
preferred set  A  E,J
Ninth  most
preferred  set  D
Tenth  most
preferred  set  A
1The utility groups are associated with the following risk aversion intervals:  (-.0001,0), (-.00001,  .00001), and
(0, .00001).
2Provisions for the farm  programs  are described  in Table 1.
(58¢/lb.),  low  trigger  price  (70¢/lb.)  and  no
interest charges,  respectively.  Farm program
B1 would  obviously be preferred to B2  since
the  former  provides  for  low  yield  disaster
payments  that  are  excluded  in  B2.  Farm
program  B1 is preferred to program  0 for the
same  reason.
Given  a choice  among the  farm  programs
in  Table  1, excluding  B1,  B2,  and  0,  a  risk
averse  producer  should  prefer  cotton  FOR
programs  I  and  L.  A  producer  should  be
indifferent  between  either of these  two pro-
grams.  Since  farm  program  0 dominates  pro-
gram  I,  risk averse  cotton producers  should
prefer a low trigger price (70¢/lb.) to the high
trigger price  (780/lb.).  The reason  being that
the lower  the  trigger  price,  the  greater  the
probability  stocks will be released.  Compar-
ing farm  program  L to 0 indicates  risk averse
producers  are  rational  in  that  they  should
prefer  no  interest  charges  for  a  reserve  to
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paying  one year's  interest.  Since  risk averse
producers  should  be  indifferent  between  I
and  L,  an  equal  trade-off  appears  to  exist
between  I which  has  no interest  and a high
trigger price  and L which has no interest for
two  years and the lower  trigger price.
Farm program  C3  is  the  only program  in
the fourth  efficient  set  for a  risk averse  pro-
ducer.  Thus farmers  should  prefer high  loan
rate  programs  to  all  cotton  FOR  programs
with  the  exception  of  I,  L,  and  0;  even
though  the  former  does  not  include  target
prices  and deficiency  payments.  Decreasing
the cotton  loan  rate by  2.5¢/lb.  (C2)  should
reduce  the typical  producer's preference  for
the  Secretary's  program  to  the  sixth  most
efficient set.
For producers  who  prefer  risk,  the  most
preferred  efficient  set contains programs  B1
and  0.  The  second  most  preferred  efficient
set contains  programs  B2,  I and N.  Despite a
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preference  for risk,  the producer should pre-
fer the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977  (B1)
to a similar farm program that excludes  disas-
ter  provisions  (B2).  Risk  loving  producers,
like  their  risk  adverse  counterparts,  should
prefer a higher entry price (program 0 vs.  N)
and a lower trigger price (program 0 vs.  I) for
the cotton  FOR.
Producers who are risk neutral should pre-
fer  programs  B1  and  0  to the  other  16 pro-
grams  described  in  Table  1.  If these  most
preferred  programs  are  not  available,  risk
neutral producers  should prefer program  B2,
F,  I,  L  and  N.  By  classifying  these  five
programs  in the  second  most preferred  effi-
cient  set,  one  can  conclude  that  if offered  a
cotton  FOR,  risk  neutral  producers  should
be indifferent between  a high entry price and
a low entry price,  if the former  is  associated
with lower total interest  costs and both have
the  same trigger price  (program N  vs.  L).
Irrespective  of  the  utility  group,  non-
participation  in  a  farm  program  (A)  is  the
least preferred  option.  The reason being that
this  option  offers  no  protection  from  price
variability.
Summary and Conclusions
With  the  proposed  elimination  of  target
prices  and a renewed  emphasis  on the  grain
FOR,  a cotton  FOR may  be a possibility for
the 1980's. The consequences of participating
in  a cotton  FOR were  analyzed  for  a typical
Texas  High Plains cotton farm  using a Monte
Carlo farm  simulation  model.  Twelve  cotton
FOR programs were  analyzed  using alterna-
tive  entry prices  ($.50,  $.525,  and  $.58/lb.),
trigger prices ($.70 and $.78/lb.), and interest
costs  (waived  in  2  or  3  years).  The  cotton
FOR programs  were compared to a continua-
tion  of the  1977  Act  and to  a program  pro-
posed by Secretary  Block in  early  1981.
Stochastic  dominance  with  respect  to  a
function  was  used  to  make  normative  fore-
casts  of  producer's  preference  for  a  cotton
FOR  as  well  as  other  farm  programs.  An
after-tax  net  present  value  distribution  for
each  farm  program  was  estimated  using  a
firm level simulation  model,  FLIPSIM.  The
distributions were  compared for three utility
groups  using  Meyer's  stochastic  dominance
program.
The results  indicate  that risk  averse  High
Plains  cotton producers  should prefer a con-
tinuation  of the Food and Agriculture  Act of
1977 to a cotton FOR.  However,  if the disas-
ter  provisions  in  the  1977  Act  were
eliminated,  this  group  of producers  should
be  indifferent  between  the  resulting  farm
program  and  a  cotton  FOR  which  has  a
58¢/lb.  entry price,  70¢/lb.  trigger price and
interest waived  in  all years.  If offered  a cot-
ton  FOR,  risk  neutral  High  Plains  cotton
producers  should prefer a high entry price to
a  low  one,  waiver  of all  interest,  and  a  low
trigger  price  to  a  high  trigger  price.  This
preference  for  cotton FOR  control  variables
should  hold  for  cotton  producers,  irrespec-
tive  of their risk aversion  classification.
Ten  of the  eighteen  farm  programs  were
preferred  by  risk  averters  to  Secretary  of
Agriculture  Block's  proposed  farm  program
of no target prices and low loan rates for High
Plains  cotton  (43¢/lb.).  Producers  who  are
either risk neutral or risk lovers preferred the
Secretary's  program  over  only  one  option,
namely,  not  participating  in  any  farm  pro-
gram.
In  conclusion,  High  Plains  cotton produc-
ers  should prefer  a continuation  of the  1977
farm  programs  to  any  of  the  cotton  FOR
programs analyzed.  However,  given a choice
between Secretary Block's proposed program
and  a cotton  FOR,  most farmers  should  pre-
fer  a  FOR.  The  CCC  loan  rate  for  High
Plains  cotton  would have  to be  increased  to
about  52.5¢/lb.  to  make  Secretary  Block's
proposed  program  more  attractive  than  the
majority of the  cotton  FOR programs.
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